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The Rehnquist Revolution
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
When historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, without a doubt
they will say that its greatest changes in constitutional law were in the area
of federalism. Over the past decade, and particularly over the last five
years, the Supreme Court has dramatically limited the scope of Congress’
powers and has greatly expanded the protection of state Sovereign Immunity. Virtually every area of law, criminal and civil, is touched by these
changes. Since I began teaching constitutional law in 1980, the most significant differences in constitutional law are a result of the Supreme
Court’s revival of federalism as a constraint on federal power.
The federalism decisions are the product of a Court, with five conservative members, deeply committed to protecting state governments from
federal encroachment. Virtually all of the recent Supreme Court cases,
including Bush v. Gore1 and the federalism decisions, have been five-four
decisions, with the majority comprised of Rehnquist, C. J.; O’Connor, J.;
Scalia, J.; Kennedy, J.; and Thomas, J. From a practical perspective, these
five Justices are the Rehnquist Court.
In the October 2000 Term, for example, the Court decided seventyeight cases; twenty-six were resolved by a five-four margin and in fourteen
of those, the majority was comprised of Rehnquist, C.J.; O’Connor, J.;
Scalia, J.; Kennedy, J.; and Thomas, J. In the October 2002 Term, the
Court decided seventy-three cases and fifteen were decided five-four, with
this grouping being the most frequent majority in six cases.
These five Justices revived federalism in three major ways. First, the
Rehnquist Court created new limits on the scope of Congress’ powers.
Particularly, the Court placed limits on Congress’ authority to legislate
under the Commerce Clause and under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Second, the Court greatly expanded the scope of state Sovereign Immunity and protection from suit in federal court. Third, the Court
reversed course and held that the Tenth Amendment is a limit on Congres* Sydney M. Irmas, Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and Political Science, University of Southern California. I want to thank everyone at Franklin Pierce Law School, for their wonderful hospitality and their insightful comments and questions, when I delivered a version of this paper
there.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2001).
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sional power; specifically, that Congress cannot compel state legislative or
regulatory action. Individually, and especially collectively, these three
doctrines dramatically changed the law.
The Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival is profoundly misguided because it denies the federal government needed authority to achieve important social objectives, especially advancing freedom and equality. This
article considers what the Rehnquist Court has done in each area and why
the decisions are undesirable changes in the law.
II. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF CONGRESS’ POWERS
From 1937 until 1995, not one federal law was invalidated as exceeding the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority. Countless criminal and civil laws were enacted under this constitutional power. It was by
far the most frequent source of authority for federal legislation. But in the
last several years, the Supreme Court made it clear that the judiciary will
enforce strict limits on Congress’ power under this provision.
In United States v. Lopez,2 the Supreme Court declared the federal Gun
Free School Zone Act unconstitutional. 3 The Gun Free School Zone Act
was a federal law that made it a crime to have a firearm within 1,000 feet
of a school.4 Alphonso Lopez, a twelfth grader at a San Antonio high
school, was caught with a gun at school.5 The district court convicted Lopez under the law,6 but the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held
that the Gun Free School Zone Act exceeded the scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.7
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court, in a five-four decision,
and began by emphasizing that Congress’ powers must be interpreted in a
limited manner.8 The Court held that Congress could regulate, under the
Commerce Clause, only in three circumstances.9 Congress may regulate:
a) the channels of interstate commerce; b) the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce; and c) activities
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.10 The Court found

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 567.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 558-559.
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that the federal law prohibiting guns near schools met none of these requirements and thus was unconstitutional.11
In United States v. Morrison,12 the Court followed Lopez and declared
unconstitutional the civil damages provision of the Violence Against
Women Act.13 This provision had created a federal cause of action for
victims of gender-motivated violence.14 The case involved a woman,
Christy Brzonkala, who was allegedly raped by football players at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute.15 The football players were not criminally prosecuted and ultimately avoided university discipline.16 Brzonkala sued under the Violence Against Women Act.17 The United States government
intervened, and defended the law, on the ground that violence against
women has a substantial effect on the national economy.18 In enacting the
Violence Against Women Act, Congress held lengthy hearings and found
that gender-motivated violence costs the American economy billions of
dollars a year.19
The Supreme Court expressly rejected these findings as insufficient to
sustain the law.20 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that Congress was
regulating non-economic activity that has traditionally been dealt with by
state laws.21 Moreover, the Court stressed that there is no jurisdictional
requirement, in the statute, necessitating proof of an effect on interstate
commerce.22 The Court said that Congress could not justify regulation, in
this area, by finding that the cumulative impact of an activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.23 The Court thus concluded:
We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local.24

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 567.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 627.
Id. at 601-602.
Id. at 601-602. Virginia Polytechnic Institute is also known as Virginia Tech.
See id. at 603.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 613.
Sen. Rpt. 103-138 (Sept. 10, 1993).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 613-618.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 617-618 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568).
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Lopez and Morrison opened the door to constitutional challenges to
countless federal laws, especially those that regulate non-economic activities. Federal environmental laws, such as the Endangered Species Act,25
are likely to be challenged on the grounds that the law regulates conduct
that does not involve channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or activities with a substantial economic effect. Similarly, federal gun laws, such as those that prohibit possession of a firearm
while subject to a domestic violence protection order,26 are also likely to be
challenged.
Another area where the Court has dramatically limited the scope of
Congress’ powers, concerns the authority to legislate under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment. This provision empowers Congress to enact
laws to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.27 In 1997, the Court significantly restricted this power by holding, in City of Boerne v. Flores,28 that
Congress may not use its Section Five powers to expand the scope of rights
or to create new rights.29
The Supreme Court, in a six-three decision, declared unconstitutional
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) because it exceeded the
scope of Congress’ Section Five powers.30 The RFRA was adopted in
1993 to overturn a Supreme Court decision that had narrowly interpreted
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.31 In 1990, the Supreme
Court had significantly lessened the protections of the Free Exercise
Clause in Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.32 Oregon law prohibited the consumption of peyote, a hallucinogenic substance.33 Native Americans challenged this law claiming that
it infringed their free exercise of religion because their religious rituals
required the use of peyote.34 Prior Supreme Court precedents upheld government actions burdening religion only if the action was necessary to
achieve a compelling government purpose.35 The Supreme Court, in
Smith, changed the law and held that the Free Exercise Clause cannot be
used to challenge neutral laws of general applicability.36 The Oregon law
prohibiting consumption of peyote was deemed neutral because the law
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000).
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2000).
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 519.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 519.
Id. at 512.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 874.
Id. at 874.
See e.g Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
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was not motivated by a desire to interfere with religion, and it was a law of
general applicability because it applied to everyone.37
In response to this decision, Congress overwhelmingly adopted the
RFRA.38 The RFRA’s express purpose was to overturn Smith and restore
the Compelling Government Purpose test.39 The RFRA required courts
considering free exercise challenges, including neutral laws of general applicability, to uphold the government actions only if they were necessary to
achieve a compelling purpose.40 Specifically, the RFRA prohibited
“[g]overnment” from “substantially burden[ing]” a person’s exercise of
religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
unless the government can demonstrate the burden “(1) is in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”41
In Flores, a church in Texas was prevented from constructing a new
facility because its building was classified as a historic landmark.42 The
church sued under the RFRA and the city challenged the constitutionality
of the law.43 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, held that the RFRA
was unconstitutional44 because Congress, under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, may not create new rights or expand the scope of existing rights.45 He further noted Congress is limited to enacting laws that
prevent or remedy violations of rights recognized by the Supreme Court.46
These must be narrowly tailored – “proportionate” and “congruent” – to
the constitutional violation.47
Justice Kennedy explained that Section Five gives Congress the authority to enact laws “to enforce” the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment.48 He stated:
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause
cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has
been given the power “to enforce,” not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 890.
Flores, 521 U.S. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 515-516; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (1994).
Flores, 521 U.S at 511-512.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 536.
Id.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 519.
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Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”49
Congress thus, is limited to enacting laws that prevent or remedy violations of rights already recognized by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the
Court said, “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”50
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion declared the RFRA unconstitutional on
the grounds that it impermissibly expanded the scope of rights and that it
was not proportionate, or congruent, as a preventative or remedial measure.51
This is a radical change in the law. No prior case has hinted at such a
limit on Congress’ powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision opens the door to challenges to many federal laws. In
three cases since Flores, namely Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 52 Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents,53 and University of Alabama v. Garrett,54 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Congress, under Section Five, cannot expand the scope of
rights and that any federal law must be a “proportionate” and “congruent”
measure to prevent and remedy constitutional violations. All three of these
cases involved the issue of whether a federal law is a valid exercise of
Congress’ Section Five powers and thus a permissible basis for suing state
governments.55 In all three cases, the Court found that the federal laws at
issue did not fit within the scope of Section Five under Flores. These three
cases are presented in detail in the next section, which discusses Congress’
power to authorize suits against state governments.
Together the limits on Congress’ powers, under the Commerce Clause
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, open the door to challenges to numerous federal laws. Even more profoundly, the Court reversed fifty years of expansive federal powers and imposed significant
constraints on Congress’ authority.
These decisions can be criticized on many grounds. They all involve
the most conservative Justices, creating significant limits on federal power,
so as to limit the ability of Congress to achieve socially desirable results.
49. Id. (brackets in original).
50. Id. at 520.
51. Id. at 536.
52. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
53. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
54. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
55. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 629 (discussing the Patent Remedy Act’s constitutionality under
Section Five); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83 (discussing ADEA’s constitutionality under Section Five);
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (discussing Title I of the ADA’s constitutionality under Section Five).
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Preventing guns near schools, providing a remedy to victims of domestic
violence, and expanding religious freedom, are all good things that the
Court is limiting. These restrictions on federal power are a radical change
in constitutional principles that have been followed since 1937 and are
particularly undesirable when looked at from the perspective of freedom
and liberty.
The Boerne decision means that people in the United States have far
less protection for their religious practices. Laws of general applicability,
whether prison regulations, zoning ordinances or historical landmark laws,
that seriously burden religion might have been successfully challenged
under the RFRA, but not any longer. Put simply, Boerne means that many
claims of free exercise of religion, that would have prevailed, now certainly will lose. People in the United States have less protection of their
rights after Boerne than they did before it.
There has been one other aspect of the Court’s Section Five decisions:
the Court has ruled that Congress cannot use this provision to regulate private conduct. In the Civil Rights Cases,56 in 1883, the Supreme Court
greatly limited Congress’ ability to use its power under the Reconstruction
Amendments to regulate private conduct.57
In United States v. Guest,58 five Justices, although not in a single opinion, concluded that Congress may outlaw private discrimination, pursuant
to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.59 Guest involved a federal
law which made it illegal for two or more persons to go “in disguise on the
highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege.”60 The Court held that
interference with the use of facilities in interstate commerce violated the
law, whether motivated by a racial animus or not.61
The majority opinion did not reach the question of whether Congress
could regulate private conduct under Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment;62 however, six of the Justices, three in a concurring opinion
and three in a dissenting opinion, expressed the view that Congress could
prohibit private discrimination under its Section Five powers.63 Justice
Tom Clark, in a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Hugo Black and
Abe Fortas, said, “the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to
enact laws punishing all conspiracies - with or without state action - that
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Id.
383 U.S. 745 (1966).
Id. at 755.
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
Guest, 383 U.S. at 760.
Id. at 756.
Id. at 755.
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interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.”64 Likewise, Justice William
Brennan in an opinion that concurred in part and dissented in part, joined
by Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Douglas, concluded that
Congress may prohibit private discrimination pursuant to Section Five.65
But in Morrison, the Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed the Civil
Rights Cases and disavowed the opinions to the contrary from Guest.66 As
described above, in the discussion of Congress’ commerce power, Morrison involved a constitutional challenge to the civil damages provision of
the Violence Against Women Act, which authorized victims of gendermotivated violence to sue under federal law.67
The United States government intervened, to defend the law, arguing
along with the plaintiff that the civil damages provision was constitutional,
both as an exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power and of its authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 As explained
above, the Court in a five-four decision held the law exceeded the scope of
the Commerce power because Congress cannot regulate non-economic
activity based on a cumulative impact on interstate commerce.69
By the same five-four margin, the Court held that the law is not constitutional as an exercise of Congress’ Section Five power.70 Chief Justice
Rehnquist writing for the Court said that Congress, under this authority,
may regulate only state and local governments, not private conduct.71
Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on “the time-honored principle that the
Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action.”72
He said that the opinions in Guest, indicating Congressional power to regulate private conduct, were only dicta.73 Thus, the civil damages provision,
of the Violence Against Women Act, was deemed to exceed the scope of
Congress’ Section Five powers because it “is not aimed at proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself
proscribe; it is directed not at any state or state actor, but at individuals
who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.”74
Again, it is clear that this decision, in the name of federalism, decreases protection of individuals. Congress is denied the ability to expand
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73
74.

Guest, 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring).
383 U.S. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 623-624.
See id. at 601-602.
See generally U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 617.
Id. at 627.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 626.
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rights and protections against private infringers of liberty. More generally,
the Court’s narrowing of Congress’ ability to protect rights is inherently
rights regressive. Perhaps there is some other justification for what the
Court has done, but the limitation on Congress’ Section Five powers
clearly lessens the protection of rights.
Whatever its other merits, there is no possible argument that Morrison
advances liberty. Congress enacted a law, to expand the rights of victims
of gender-motivated violence, based on findings of a serious social problem and the inadequacy of remedies in the state courts. The Supreme
Court’s invalidation of the statute thus restricts the rights of women
throughout the country. Conceivably, it could be argued that Morrison
protects the rights of those accused of sexual violence, by preventing them
from being sued in federal court. Then the question would have to be,
which is more rights progressive: expanding the ability of victims of gender-motivated violence to sue or protecting those accused of such acts from
being sued? Merely stating the question makes the answer obvious.
III. THE EXPANSION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Rehnquist Court made another key change in the law. The Supreme Court significantly expanded the scope of state Sovereign Immunity. In Alden v. Maine,75 the Court held that a state government may not
be sued in state court, even on a federal claim, without its consent, because
of state Sovereign Immunity.76 Alden involved a claim by probation officers in Maine, that they were owed overtime pay under the Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act.77 They sued in federal court, but their suit was dismissed because of the Eleventh Amendment.78 Then the probation officers
sued in state court.79 The Supreme Court in a five-four decision, however,
held that Sovereign Immunity broadly protects state governments and precludes suits against un-consenting states in state courts.80
In a series of recent cases, the Court has greatly limited the ability of
Congress to authorize suits against state governments in federal courts. In
1996, the conservative majority of the Court held, in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida,81 that Congress may authorize suits against states only pursuant to
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

527 U.S. 706 (1999).
Id. at 732.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 712.
Id.
Id.
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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laws enacted under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.82 As described above, in Flores, the Court limited Congress’ Section Five powers
to enacting laws that prevent or remedy violations of rights recognized by
the Supreme Court; Congress cannot expand the scope of rights or create
new rights.83
The combination of Seminole Tribe and Flores has already had a devastating effect on many types of claims. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court held that
state governments could not be sued for patent infringement;84 in Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents, the Court decided that state governments may
not be sued for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act;85 and
in University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court ruled that state governments
may not be sued for employment discrimination in violation of section one
of the Americans with Disabilities Act.86 In each case, the Court, in a fivefour decision, concluded that Congress expanded the scope of rights, and
that the laws could not be justified as narrowly tailored to prevent or remedy constitutional violations.
These decisions mean that state governments cannot be sued, when
they violate federal law. How can the supremacy of federal law be assured
and vindicated if states can violate the Constitution, or federal laws, and
not be held accountable?
At oral argument in Alden, the Solicitor General of the United States,
Seth Waxman, quoted to the Court from the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI.87 Waxman contended that suits against states are essential to assure the
supremacy of federal law.88 Justice Kennedy’s response to this argument is
astounding. He states:
The constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign immunity in its own courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law. The
States and their officers are bound by obligations imposed by the
Constitution and by federal statutes that comport with the constitutional design. We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to
honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United
States. The good faith of the States thus provides an important as82. Id. at 60.
83. 521 U.S. at 519-520.
84. 527 U.S. at 629.
85. 528 U.S. at 82.
86. 531 U.S. at 356.
87. Seth Waxman, Oral Argument Supreme Court of the United States, Alden v. Maine (Washington
D.C., Mar. 31, 1999) (copy of transcript on file at 1999 WL 216178 (U.S.)).
88. Id.
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surance that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.”89
What, then, is the assurance that state governments will comply with
federal law? Is it the trust in the good faith of state governments? Is it
possible to imagine that thirty or forty years ago, at the height of the civil
rights movement the Supreme Court would have issued such a statement;
state governments simply could be trusted to voluntarily comply with federal law? Justice Kennedy’s words in Alden reflect the Rehnquist Court’s
strong faith in state governments and desire to limit both federal legislative
and judicial power.
Sovereign Immunity is an anachronistic relic. The principle of Sovereign Immunity is derived from English law, which assumed that “the King
can do no wrong.”90 Since the time of Edward the First, the Crown of England has not been suable unless it has specifically consented to suit.91
Throughout American history, United States courts have applied this principle, 92 although they often have admitted that its justification in this
country is unclear.93
A doctrine derived from the premise, “the King can do no wrong,” deserves no place in American law. The United States was founded on a
rejection of a monarchy and of royal prerogatives.94 American government
is based on the fundamental recognition that the government and government officials can do wrong and must be held accountable. Sovereign
Immunity undermines that basic notion.
Sovereign Immunity is inconsistent with the United States Constitution. Nowhere does the document mention, or even imply, that governments have complete immunity to suit. Sovereign Immunity is a doctrine
based on a common law principle borrowed from the English common
law.95 However, Article VI of the Constitution states that the Constitution,
89. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-755.
90. See Kenneth Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, vol. 5, § 27:2, 6-7 (2d ed., K.C. Davis Pub.
Co. 1984) (quoting Blackstone); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice, vol. 2, 210
(West 1985).
91. U. S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205 (1882).
92. Id. at 207. (“The principle has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always
been treated as an established doctrine.”) (citations omitted).
93. Id.
94. See e.g. U.S. Const. art. I § 9 (stating “[n]o Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States.”).
95. See supra n. 90, at 6-7; Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice, vol. 2, 210
(West 1985). Actually, as John Orth pointed out to me, the phrase, “the King can do no wrong,” has
many possible meanings. It might simply mean that when a wrong occurs, someone else must have
done it, because the King can do no wrong. Alternatively, it might mean that a remedy must exist,
because the King cannot do a wrong, as would occur if a harm went un-remedied.
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and laws made pursuant to them, are the supreme law and, as such, it
should prevail over claims of Sovereign Immunity.96 Yet, Sovereign Immunity, a common law doctrine, trumps even the United States Constitution and bars suits against government entities, when they violate the Constitution and federal laws.
Sovereign Immunity is inconsistent with a central maxim of American
government: that no one, not even the government, is above the law. The
effect of Sovereign Immunity is to place the government above the law. It
ensures that some individuals who have suffered egregious harms will be
unable to receive redress for their injuries.97 The judicial role of enforcing
and upholding the Constitution is rendered illusory when the government
has complete immunity to suit. Moreover, Sovereign Immunity undermines the basic principle, announced in Marbury v. Madison,98 that “[t]he
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”99
IV. REVIVAL OF THE TENTH AMENDMENT
A final aspect of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival has been its
use of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on federal power. In the first third
of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that the Tenth Amendment reserved a zone of activities for exclusive state control. In Hammer
v. Dagenhart,100 for example, the Court struck down a federal law prohibiting child labor on the grounds that it violated the Tenth Amendment.101
After 1937, however, the Court rejected this view.102 No longer was the
Tenth Amendment seen as a limit on federal power. It was just a reminder
that Congress could not act unless there was express or implied constitutional authority.
Professor Laurence Tribe remarked that “[f]or almost four decades after 1937, the conventional wisdom was that federalism in general - and the
rights of states in particular - provided no judicially enforceable limits on
congressional power.”103 In 1976, the Court appeared to revive federalism
96. U.S. Const. art. VI.
97. John E. H. Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and the New York Courts of Claims, 22 Admin. L.
Rev. 39, 56 (1969).
98. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
99. Id. at 163.
100. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
101. Id. at 277.
102. See U. S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).
103. Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 378 (2d ed. Foundation Press, Inc. 1987).
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as a limit on Congressional powers in National League of Cities v.
Usery,104 where the Court invalidated a federal law that required state and
local governments to pay their employees a minimum wage.105 The Court,
in an opinion by then Justice Rehnquist, held that Congress could not regulate states in areas of “traditional” or “integral” state responsibility.106 But
just nine years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,107 the Court expressly overruled National League of Cities.108 Justice Rehnquist, in a short dissent, said that he believed that his view would
again triumph on the Court.109
In two decisions, the Rehnquist Court has done just that, and it revived
the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on Congress’ authority. In New York
v. United States,110 the Court, for only the second time in fifty-five years
and the first time since the overruled National League of Cities decision,
invalidated a federal law as violating the Tenth Amendment.111 In New
York, the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
of 1985112 created a statutory duty for states to provide for the safe disposal
of radioactive wastes generated within their borders.113 The Act provided
monetary incentives for states to comply with the law, allowing states to
impose a surcharge on radioactive wastes received from other states.114
Additionally, and most controversially, the law provided that states would
“take title” to any wastes within their borders that was not properly disposed of by January 1, 1996, to ensure effective state government action.115
The state government would “be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred.”116
The Supreme Court ruled that Congress, pursuant to its authority under
the Commerce Clause, could regulate the disposal of radioactive wastes;117
however, by a six-three margin, the Court held that the “take title” provision of the law is unconstitutional, because its gives state governments the
choice between “either accepting ownership of waste or regulating accord-

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id. at 855-856.
Id. at 853-855.
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 580.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b-2021e (1988).
Id. at §§ 2021c(a)(1)(A).
Id. at §§ 2021e(d)(1).
Id. at §§ 2021d(2)(c)(i).
Id.
N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
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ing to the instructions of Congress.”118 Justice O’Connor, writing for the
Court, said that it was impermissible for Congress to impose either option
on the states.119 Forcing states to accept ownership of radioactive wastes
would impermissibly “commandeer” state governments120 and requiring
state compliance with federal regulatory statutes would impermissibly impose, on states, a requirement to implement federal legislation.121 The
Court concluded that it was “clear” that because of the Tenth Amendment,
“[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact, or administer, a federal regulatory program.”122
A few years later, in Printz v. United States,123 the Court applied and
extended New York. Printz involved a challenge to the federal Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act.124 The law required that the “chief law
enforcement officer,” of each local jurisdiction, conduct background
checks before issuing permits for firearms.125 The Court, in a five-four
decision, found that the law violated the Tenth Amendment.126
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and revived the phrase “dual sovereignty,” to explain the structure of American government.127 The Court
concluded that Congress violated the Tenth Amendment by compelling
states to implement federal mandates.128
These decisions can be criticized on many levels. The anticommandeering principle that these decisions rest on has no constitutional
basis. Indeed, for a Justice who emphasizes text as the central focus of
constitutional analysis, these conclusions should be especially troubling.
Where the Constitution wanted state sovereignty to be constitutionally
protected, the text provides such protection. For example, barring suits
against states by citizens from other states and, perhaps, in the Tenth
Amendment. But in other areas, it is troubling that such Justices allow a
non-textual value to trump textual protections.
More generally, the key question is: Why is protecting states so important that it should be seen as limiting the very definition of Congressional powers under Article I? If the Court is serious, that state sovereignty restricts the scope of Article I, entirely apart from Tenth Amend118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 175.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 188.
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18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
Id. at § 922 (s)(2).
Prinz, 521 U.S. at 935.
Id. at 918.
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ment considerations, then New York has even broader implications than
generally recognized. The case could portend a return to pre-1937 constitutional jurisprudence, where the Court also used considerations of state
sovereignty, to narrowly define the scope of federal powers, such as defining commerce to apply to only one stage of business, distinct from mining,
manufacture, or production. Although it is unlikely that these particular
distinctions will reemerge, others could arise in the future.
The anti-commandeering principle in New York and Printz is based on
ensuring government accountability. Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New
York, emphasized that when Congress compels state government action,
accountability is undermined.129 She explained that Congress can make the
decision, but then states are held politically responsible for the decision
that is not theirs.130
On the one hand, Justice O’Connor is to be commended for articulating an explicit value of federalism; something that is all too rare in the federalism cases. On reflection, however, the factual assumptions behind Justice O’Connor’s position are highly questionable. Justice O’Connor assumes that if Congress forces the states to do something, voters will not
hold Congress responsible, but will blame the conduct on the primary actor, state governments. Voters, however, can surely understand that the
state is acting because it is required to by federal law. Federal mandates
force every person to do unwanted things. Paying taxes is a simple example. Why would people not understand that state governments, might also
have to do something because of a federal mandate?
State government officials, of course, can explain to the voters that the
federal government required the particular actions. Justice O’Connor
never explains why the federal government will not be held accountable
under such circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
It is impossible to overstate the significance of these changes in constitutional law. For over fifty years, after 1937, the assumption was that
Congress’ powers were to be broadly interpreted. The Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to empower the federal government to deal with
national problems. Now, however, the Court is restricting congressional
powers and aggressively protecting state governments.

129. New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
130. Id. at 168-169.
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The key question is what, if anything, is gained by this change in the
law? Is the country better or worse because of these rulings? It is striking
to look at the laws that the Rehnquist Court has invalidated: statutes prohibiting guns near schools; allowing victims of gender-motivated violence
to sue; expanding religious freedom; permitting states to be sued for patent
infringement and employment discrimination against the elderly and people with disabilities; requiring states to clean up nuclear wastes; and mandating that state and local governments do background checks before issuing permits for firearms. All of these are enormously desirable and important laws; most passed Congress by overwhelming margins.
The Supreme Court’s decisions invalidating these laws serve no apparent purpose other than the goal of limiting federal power. The rulings,
which are a dramatic change in course in constitutional law, are a policy
choice by the conservatives on the current Court. I have no doubt that
someday a new set of Justices will reverse these cases, and return to the
broad definitions of federal power, which were followed from 1937 until
the 1990s. The complex world, of the early twenty-first century, demands
a federal government with the powers to handle its national problems.

